can be found in 22 . In 26 it was shown that the actual round functions of the DES generate the alternating group. The question of whether the 2 56 encryptions of the full DES themselves form a group, or generate a small group see 12, 20 , was answered in the negative in 5 and a lower bound of 10 2499 was obtained in 4 for the size of this generated group. Thus the attacks of 12 are not applicable to the DES.
In 11 , the groups generated by the round function of mini-versions" of the block cipher IDEA 17 were calculated.
However the ability of a cipher or its round functions to generate a large group does not alone guarantee security: an example of a weak cipher generating the symmetric group on the message space was given recently in 21 . The most that can be said is that a small group may lead to an insecurity.
Here we examine properties of the groups related to a block cipher more re ned than simply their size. Consider the following statement of Wernsdorf 26 regarding the group generated by the round functions of DES:
Since the generated alternating group A 2 64 is a large simple group and primitive on V 64 the message space we can exclude several imaginable cryptanalytic`shortcuts' of the DES algorithm." In the next section we will formalise our discussion of the groups associated with iterated block ciphers and sketch the theory of primitive and imprimitive groups. Next, motivated by Wernsdorf's statement, we examine attacks on iterated block ciphers whose round functions generate imprimitive groups. Then we argue that these imprimitivity-based attacks enable a designer to build trapdoors into iterated block ciphers. We give an example of a 64-bit DES-like cipher having 32 rounds and an 80-bit key which is resistant to linear and di erential cryptanalysis but whose security i s s e v erely compromised by such an attack using 2 32 chosen plaintexts. With a careful and deliberately weak choice of key-schedule and knowledge of the trapdoor, the cipher can be completely broken using only a few known plaintexts and 2 41 trial encryptions. While the trapdoor in our example is not so well disguised, it can easily be made undetectable if the cipher design is not made public. We conclude by giving some implications of our work and ideas for future research.
We mention here the recent work of 24 in which block ciphers containing partial trapdoors are constructed: these give only partial information about keys and require rather large S-box components to be present in the cipher. However, they are computationally undetectable. In contrast, our trapdoor can beinserted into a block cipher with very small S-boxes, reveals the entire key, but is detectable. In the language of 24 , it is a full, but detectable, trapdoor. It is a moot point whether full and undetectable trapdoors can be inserted in truly practical block ciphers.
Iterated Block Ciphers and their Groups
We begin by describing a model for iterated block ciphers. W e will regard such a cipher as a set of invertible encryption functions mapping a set M, the message space, to itself, or equivalently as a subset of the symmetric group on M, denoted S M . We can then use notions from the theory of permutation groups to study such ciphers. The necessary algebraic background can be found in 25 or 27 .
The encryption functions of a particular iterated block cipher are obtained by the composition of round functions, that is, a set of keyed invertible functions on M, which w e denote by fR k : M ! M;k2Kg:
Here K is called the round keyspace and k a round key. In a t-round iterated block cipher, the encryption functions take the form E k 1 ;:::;kt = R k 1 R k 2 R k t where the k i may be derived from a key from a larger session keyspace according to some key-scheduling algorithm, or may be independently chosen. Thus, the encryption of plaintext m under round keys k 1 ; k 2 ; : : : ; k t is mE k 1 ;:::;kt = mR k 1 R k 2 R k t for the moment we denote all functions as acting on the right of their arguments, so that in a composition, functions are evaluated from left to right.
We write G = R k : k 2 K for the group generated by the round functions, that is, the smallest subgroup of S M containing each R k . Similarly we write G t = R k 1 : : : R k t : k i 2 K for the subgroup of S M generated by the t-round encryptions with independent round keys. We say that G and the G t act on the message space M. The groups G t are hard to compute in practice, but we have the following result relating them to the group G generated by the round functions: Theorem 1 11 . With notation as above, G t is a normal subgroup of G. Moreover the group generated by the t-round encryptions with round keys from a particular key-schedule is a subgroup of G t . Example 1. The DES described in full in 7 is essentially an iterated block cipher with t = 16 rounds, message space M = V 64 , the vectorspace of dimension 64 over Z 2 , and round keyspace K = V 48 . The form taken by the round functions R k of the DES is: mR k = l;rR k = r ; l f r ; k where l;r 2 V 32 denote the left and right halves of message m and f : V 32 V 48 ! V 32 : The group G generated by the round functions of the DES is known to be the alternating group on V 64 , denoted A 2 64 , 26 . Since G is simple and G 16 is normal in G, the group generated by the DES with independent round keys is also A 2 64 . The group generated by the DES itself with key-schedule as de ned in 7 is not known.
We will follow the exposition of 27 , Sections 6 and 7 on imprimitive groups. Our presentation is necessarily compressed. 
The set of g form a permutation group G on f1; 2; : : : ; r g and the map g ! g is a group homomorphism from G onto G.
Attacks Based on Imprimitivity
Suppose the group G generated by the round functions R k : M ! M of a t-round cipher acts imprimitively on M, and let Y 1 ; : : : ; Y r be a complete non-trivial block system for G. Suppose further that, given m 2 M, there is a description of the blocks such that it is easy to compute the i with m 2 Y i and that round keys k 1 ; : : : ; k t are in use.
Our basic attack is a chosen-plaintext attack whose success is independent of the numbertof rounds in use. Alternatively, the basic attack determines the permutation g of G corresponding to g: w e can think of f1; : : : ; r g as being the message space of a new cipher where the encryption of i is ig for round keys k 1 ; : : : ; k t and regard our basic attack as simply obtaining all the plaintext ciphertext pairs for a xed set of round keys.
Key-Schedule Dependent Attack
Every choice of round keys k 1 ; : : : ; k t determines a corresponding permutation g of f1; 2; : : : ; r g . It is conceivable that there is an attack on the new cipher more e cient than exhaustively obtaining all the ciphertexts. Ideally such an attack w ould also obtain key information. As an important example, the round keys may be derived from a session key in such a w a y that g is wholely determined by only a part of the session key information.
In practice, this information might take the form of the values of certain bits of the session key, or the value of linear expressions involving session key bits. We can think of g as being determined by k eys from a reduced keyspace. Then it may befeasible to carry out an exhaustive search of the reduced keyspace using only a few known plaintext ciphertext pairs to determine a unique reduced key. Given such session key information, it may then bepossible to deduce the complete session key by another exhaustive search. We have a divide-and-conquer attack on the session key. This latter attack is then closely related to the attacks of 23 and 9 on ciphers whose round functions possess linear factors and linear structures respectively. F or example, when M = V n and the Y i consist of a linear subspace U of V n and its cosets, we h a v e a special type of linear factor as described in 23 where the plaintext and ciphertext maps are equal and map coset Y i = U + a i to a i .
Multiple Block System Attack
In an extension of the basic attack, we make use of two or more complete non-trivial block systems. This attack is applicable to any cipher where the intersections of blocks from di erent systems can be computed and are small".
A DES-like Cipher with a Trapdoor
Given the description of a set of round functions, it appears to be a di cult computational problem either to nd a non-trivial complete block system for the corresponding group G or to disprove the existence of such a system. However the attacks above show that an iterated block cipher with an imprimitive group G is inherently weak if a complete block system is known.
It appears then that using a set of round functions which generate an imprimitive group whose block system is not revealed may lead to a block cipher containing a trapdoor that is di cult to detect. To give a convincing demonstration of this, we should build a set of round functions according to recognised principles e.g. Shannon's principles of di usion and confusion. The individual components should satisfy relevant design criteria and we should also demonstrate the security of our cipher against known attacks. This is our objective in this section. We give a full design for such a block cipher, except for a key-schedule. In the next section we will describe how our round functions were designed to generate an imprimitive group and how the cipher can be broken.
Description of Round Function
Perhaps the most commonly used template in the design of a block cipher is the Feistel construction. In turn the most celebrated Feistel-type cipher is the DES itself. With reference to example 1 and 7 , the f function of the DES consists of four components: we write fr; k = P S E r k where | the expansion phase, E, is a linear map from V 32 to V 48 , | k is the 48-bit round key, derived from a 56 bit session key, | S denotes the operation of the S-boxes | eight carefully selected 6 bit to 4 bit functions, numbered 1; : : : ; 8 operating in parallel on V 48 , | P is a carefully selected bit permutation of V 32 .
Our proposed block cipher consists of 32 repetitions of DES-like round functions:
l;rR k = r ; l P S E r k :
Here E and P are as in the original DES, but the S-boxes are replaced by the boxes presented in the appendix. Our round keys k are also 48-bits and are derived from an 80-bit session key according to a key-scheduling algorithm which w e leave unspeci ed. Any suitably strong schedule could be used for example, we could expand the original DES schedule.
We note that the selection of S-boxes is critical to the security o f t h e DES. Numerous attacks have been made on versions of the DES with modi ed S-boxes: see for example the early critique of DES in 10 , the di erential attacks on the DES with modi ed S-boxes in 2 and the attack of 15 on the proposals of 13 .
Each S-box in the appendix has the following properties, similar to those given in 5 for the DES S-boxes: S1 Each S-box has six bits of input, four bits of output. S2 The best linear approximation of an S-box in the sense of 18 , equation 3 holds with probability p over all inputs, where jp , S7 For any non-zero input di erence i i 0 not equal to one of those speci ed in S4, S5, the number of ordered pairs i; i 0 leading to a given non-zero output di erence is at most 16. For the input di erences in S4 and S5, the corresponding maximum is 24.
S8 For any non-zero input di erence i i 0 , the number of ordered pairs i; i 0 leading to an output di erence of zero is at most 12.
S2 guarantees that the S-boxes are not too linear, while S3 ensures they are balanced. S4 S6 can be regarded as weak avalanche criteria. Thus our S-boxes automatically have some desirable features.
We also draw to the reader's attention the properties P1 P1 The four bits output from each S-box are distributed so that two o f them a ect centre bits, and the other two a ect outer bits of S-boxes in the next round. P2 The four bits output from each S-box a ect six di erent S-boxes in the next round, no two a ect the same S-box.
P3
For two S-boxes j, k, if an output bit from S-box j a ects a centre bit of S-box k, then an output bit from S-box k cannot a ect a centre bit of S-box j.
Security Against Linear and Di erential Attacks
Here we estimate the resistance of our example to linear 18 and di erential 2, 3 cryptanalysis. We begin by estimating the complexity of a linear attack. By property S2 and Lemma 3 of 18 , the best linear expression that is built up roundby-round and involves input bits to round 2, output bits from round 31, key bits and a linear approximation in every round will hold with approximate probability p L where jp L , 1 While a more delicate analysis may nd linear characteristics not involving linear approximations in every round, it seems unlikely that these will have probability larger than the above bound on p L since this bound is calculated using the highest per-round probability. We make the rough assumption that a linear attack using Algorithm 2 of 18 would require at least 2 62 known plaintexts. The success of a di erential attack depends on nding a high probability characteristic: a t-round characteristic having probability p is a sequence of di erences m 1 ; m 2 ; : : : ; m t , 1 ; m t such that if m 1 is the di erence in plaintexts m m 0 input to the rst round, then the di erences propagated to the inputs of subsequent rounds are m 2 ; : : : m t with probability p, assuming independent round keys.
In practice, at least a 29 round characteristic is needed to attack a 32 round iterated cipher. The number of plaintext input pairs required in a successful attack based on such a c haracteristic having probability p is at least 1 p . Of particular importance are iterative characteristics where the output di erence at the last round is equal to the initial input di erence | such a c haracteristic can be concatenated with itself many times to form a longer characteristic. To provide practical security against a di erential attack, we need to bound the probability of short iterative c haracteristics. For further details, see 2, 3 .
We s a y that an S-box j is active in round i of a characteristic if m i involves a non-zero input di erence to S-box j. We can use properties S3 to S6, P2 and P3 and arguments similar to those of 5 to show the following for our cipher: Lemma 1. If round i of a characteristic consists of two adjacent active S-boxes j; j + 1 then either round i , 1 or round i + 1 or both has at least one active S-box. If round i of a characteristic has only one active S-box j, then either round i , 1 or round i + 1 or both has at least one active S-box.
A 29 round characteristic having no rounds without active S-boxes must involve a total of at least 29 active S-boxes. Using S7 and assuming independence, we can bound the probability of such a pattern by p 24 64 29 = 2 ,41 . We have found characteristics with probability close to this, but omit the details. An attractive pattern of di erences used in 3 to attack the DES involves active S-boxes on even numbered rounds and no active S-boxes on odd numbered rounds. From the above lemma, the active rounds must involve at least a pattern of 3 adjacent S-boxes. By property S8, we can bound the probability o f a 29 round pattern of this type by 12 64 42 = 2 , 101 . One further pattern of di erences that we consider involves no active S-boxes on every third round. Using P3 and the lemma above, we can show that such a c haracteristic must involve 3 or more active S-boxes on the two active rounds. The probability of such a c haracteristic over 29 rounds is, using S7, at most 2 ,41 . The analysis can be carried further, but it su ces to note here that our cipher possesses a reasonable degree of resistance to di erential cryptanalysis.
Trapdoor Design
Each S-box in the appendix has the following property:
By property P1, the combination of P followed by E moves two of the four outputs of the S-box say q i and q j so as to a ect centre bits of S-boxes in the next round. These two outputs are dependent o n e v ery input bit, while the other two outputs depend only on the outer bits p 1 ; p 2 ; p 5 ; p 6 input to the S-box. For example, P moves output bit q 3 of S-box 1 t o position 23 in the output of the f function. After XORing with the left half and swopping, this position a ects a centre bit, p 4 , of S-box 6 in the next round. Thus q 3 depends on all six input bits to S-box 1 .
F rom the property above, it follows that the output bits of the f function in positions 1; 4; 5; 8; : : : ; 29; 32 depend only on round key bits and the f function inputs in the same positions, 1; 4; 5; 8; : : : ; 29; 32 these being the f function input bits which after E and key XOR become outer bits of S-boxes. We therefore have: Lemma 2. Label the 2 16 distinct additive cosets of the 16 dimensional subspace U = f0; x 2 ; x 3 ; 0 ; 0 ; x 6 ; x 7 ; 0 ; : : : ; 0 ; x 30 ; x 31 ; 0 : x i 2 Z 2 g of V 32 by U a 1 ; : : : ; U a 2 16 . Then for every j and every round key k, there exists an l such that P S E U a j k U a l :
Notice that for any subset W of subspace U, w e h a v e U W = U , s o U a i P S E U a j k = U a i a l = U a m for some m. Therefore U a i ; U a j R k = U a j ; U a m . It is easy to see that the R k act transitively on V 64 and we h a v e Lemma 3. The 2 32 subsets U a i ; U a j of V 64 form a complete nontrivial block system for G, the group generated by the round functions of our cipher.
The round functions of our cipher generate an imprimitive group where the blocks of a complete system are easily identi ed. Thus our cipher is susceptible to the basic attack described in Section 3 with 2 32 chosen plaintexts. Suppose further that a key-schedule is chosen such that over the 32 rounds, only 40 bits of the 80-bit session key are involved in XORs with outputs of the E expansion which become outer bits of the S-boxes. Then, in the terminology of Section 3, the permutation g is determined by only half of the session key bits and an exhaustive attack o n those bits can be successfully carried out with knowledge of a handful of plaintext ciphertext pairs. The remaining 40 bits of session key can then also be found by exhaustive attack, the total complexity of the attack being around 2 41 trial encryptions, well within the bounds of practicality. Notice that this attack depends crucially on the interaction between the system of imprimitivity and the key-schedule.
Discussion and Conclusions
We h a v e considered attacks based on a property of a group associated with an iterated block cipher. The attacks motivate a new design criterion for iterated block ciphers: the group generated by the round functions should beprimitive. Unfortunately this property seems to behard to verify in practice. We note that the DES and probably IDEA do satisfy this property.
We have given an example of a cipher secure in many conventional senses but weak because of a deliberately inserted trapdoor. There are however some immediate criticisms that can be made of our example. Firstly, the S-boxes are incomplete that is, not every output bit of the Sboxes depends on every input bit. This goes against a generally accepted design principle for S-boxes 1, 14, 19 and would arouse suspicion. A close examination of the S-boxes and their interaction with the P permutation would then reveal our trapdoor. Incompleteness in the S-boxes also leads to a block cipher where half of the ciphertext bits are independent of half of the plaintext bits. Thus our trapdoor is not so well hidden. Secondly and less seriously, our cipher's resistance to di erential attacks is not as high as one might expect from a 32 round system. Suppose however that the round function design and weak key-schedule algorithm of our example are not made public for example, by using tamper-resistant hardware. We are then given a 64-bit iterated block cipher with 32 rounds and an 80-bit key and could be truthfully told by a panel of experts that it is secure against linear and di erential attacks. The incompleteness noted above can be hidden by applying a suitable invertible output transformation to the ciphertexts. Because of the size of the message space and choice of output transformation, we w ould then beunlikely to beable to detect any block structure just by examining plaintext ciphertext pairs. Yet our example cipher contains a trapdoor rendering the system completely insecure to anyone with knowledge of the trapdoor. Clearly in this situation, we must have complete faith in the purveyor of the block cipher.
We conclude by suggesting some avenues for further research.
The choice of trapdoor in our example was forced upon us by a combination of the E expansion, the round key XORing and the bitwise nature of the P permutation. Can undetectable" trapdoors based on more complex systems of imprimitivity beinserted in otherwise conventional ciphers? It is easily shown that, in a DES-like cipher, any system based on a linear sub-space and its cosets leads to a noticeable regularity in the XOR tables of small S-boxes. It seems that we must look beyond the linear" systems considered here, or consider other types of round function. Our attention has been directed to block systems preserved by the group G, that is, on a per-round basis. It might also be interesting to look at the case where the round functions generate a primitive group, but the subgroup generated by the t-round cipher itself has a block structure.
Attacks exploiting a block structure holding probablistically may also be powerful and worth examining.
